August 8: an Important Date in Canadian Military History

August 8 is a day of special importance in Canadian military history. On that date, in two separate years, Canadian forces in a major war had achieved a spectacular operational success and appeared to have opened the way to a potentially decisive breakthrough.

August 8, 1918 was the start of the Amiens offensive. As early as May 1918, Field Marshal Haig, commanding the British Expeditionary Force (which the Canadian Corps reported to) selected the Amiens sector as the area to launch an offensive and secure the railway lines running north from Paris. German attacks on the Marne in the summer delayed the British offensive.

The Allies prepared in secret, and the Canadian and Australian corps were given the burden of the initial attack. General Currie was given just three weeks notice of the actual date of the attack – then kept his own division commmanders in the dark until July 29, a day before the corps relocated. When the 100,000 men (and 20,000 horses) of the corps made the move, each man had a note pasted in his paybook

KEEP YOUR MOUTH SHUT

The enemy knew that where the Canadians appeared in the line, a major offensive was likely. As they had at Vimy, Hill 70 and Passchendaele, the Canadians got things done. To that end an elaborate deception plan fooled the Germans into thinking the Canadian part of the line was thinning out when in reality they were massing for attack. There would be no week-long preparatory barrage, as had been done at Vimy.

8th August, 1918 A painting by Australian official war artist Will Longstaff, in oil on linen, painted in 1918-1919 on a 107cm x 274cm canvas. This painting depicts shows German prisoners heading back towards Amiens, visible in the distance, off to the west from the artist's viewpoint, while artillery advances after the Allied armies.

At midnight on August 8, a pair of Canadian-flown bombers orbited the front, masking the sound of dozens of tanks getting into position - another reason not to shell the area in advance. All hopes were placed on the tanks getting forward with the infantry.

At Zero Hour on August 8, three divisions of Canadians attacked abreast behind a rolling barrage and into a heavy mist. There was little resistance at first, stiffening toward mid-morning. Four Victoria Crosses were awarded to Canadians for engaging enemy machine guns that day – three of them posthumously. Fourteen hours after the attack began, the Canadian Corps had advanced twelve kilometres and destroyed two German divisions, taking over 5,000 prisoners. The enemy would continue to resist until November, but for General Erich Ludendorff, their chief strategist, August 8 was “The Black Day of the German Army in the history of this war.”

It was the start of The Hundred Days, and coincidentally the last battle of the Canadian Corps as an all-volunteer force. Among the men replacing the 1036 killed, 2803 wounded and 29 taken prisoner on the first day of the battle were conscripts – the first time Canadians sent draftees into combat overseas.

Twenty-six years later, the 1st Canadian Army in Normandy, launching its first major offensive, won an equally impressive Canadian operational victory. After weeks of tough fighting south of Caen, in particular the heights of the Verrières Ridge on which German forces held out during many costly attacks, the Canadians planned to implement radical new tactics. Currie had been able to achieve surprise at Amiens. Lieutenant-General Simonds, commanding 2nd Canadian Corps, knew that he could not achieve surprise of time or location of his attack. Instead, he sought surprise by the method.

The Canadians (and British divisions attacking in concert) would attack at night, with tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Fully tracked APCs were created by stripping howitzers out of self-propelled guns. “Artificial moonlight” would be created by bouncing searchlight beams off low lying cloud. And armoured columns would find their way in the dark by using radio-navigation aids and watching streams of tracer fired by anti-aircraft guns for the purposes of navigation.

As at Amiens, the first attacks by the Canadians and neighbouring British divisions were a success. By noon on August 8, the Verrières Ridge, which had withstood numerous attacks, was finally in Allied hands. Only two weeks earlier, Canadian battalions had battered themselves in fruitless attacks – the destruction of the Black Watch on July 25, when about 320 men went up the heights and 300 became casualties, has become a thing of legend.

The late Brian Reid wrote of the moment of victory in his summary of the battle, NO HOLDING BACK. He noted that, as the motto of Britain’s Royal Tank Regiment states, the Canadian tanks had fought through mud and blood, and reached the green fields beyond. They had penetrated the mass of German tank forces that had barred their way since D-Day. The road to Falaise, that vital crossroads town, was wide open. The commander of the Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment – one of the many infantry regiments converted to armour during the war – stood atop the Verrières Ridge pleading with his brigadier to give the order to advance. The brigadier held firm, his orders were to open the way for a different division.

A sniper’s bullet ended the brigadier’s war. His 2nd Armoured Brigade held firm, and the 4th Canadian Division did not pass through the location for another ten hours. Simonds, in his command post further back, feared an enemy counter-attack – the standard German method of defence. What happened on August 8 has been debated ever since. Some have suggested August 8, 1944 could have been the second Black Day for the German Army, the beginning of an end similar to what happened at Amiens.
John English, in his history of the Normandy Campaign, lamented “the Black Day...visited upon the German Army on 8 August 1918...was not repeated in the half-forgotten summer of 1944. In the final analysis Operation Totalize was a failure.”

Brian Reid on the other hand said “one point...towers above all else: Operation Totalize was a successful operation of war.” But only as a limited breakthrough. It was not the beginning of the end – Reid says this did not happen for many reasons – indecision and hesitation, but also cumbersome doctrine, inferior equipment and an unwieldy plan, made worse by flawed commanders, over-promises by the air forces, and ultimately, luck. The Germans also had a say in what happened.

Had August 8, 1944 been the start of another Hundred Days, it would probably be as well remembered in the public consciousness today as the date June 6. Instead, total victory over Germany would require 273 more days, and August 8 is to most Canadians just another day.

Canadian D-Day Objectives: What the Historical Record Says

 “Canadian soldiers stomed Juno Beach on D-Day...achieving every single objective.”

Now that the AI-generated content machines have pumped out their annual share of uncritical pronunciamentos about Canada’s role on D-Day, what does the historical record actually say?

Canadian Objectives

Canada’s role on D-Day was an important one. Putting aside the part 1 Canadian Parachute Battalion played in the pivotal flank battles as part of 6th British Airborne Division, we can focus on the operations on Juno Beach, one of the five Allied landing sectors in Normandy on June 6, 1944.

What were the Canadians supposed to do?

The Official History of The Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume III, spells it out clearly. “On D-Day (Major-)General (Rod) Keller's (3rd Canadian Division was) to seize an area extending some 10 miles inland to include high ground west of Caen, astride the main road to Bayeux.”

With the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group on the right and the 8th Brigade Group on the left, D-Day on Juno Beach was a four phase operation.

PHASE I – land astride the mouth of the SEULLES RIVER, mop up the coastal region and clear a beachhead up to phase line YEW.

PHASE II – take the intermediate phase line ELM, including crossings over the SEULLES and the MUE tributary, as well as high ground near COLOMBY-SUR-THAON, ANISY and ANGUENY with all possible speed while the reserve, 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, landed where needed most and prepared to assist in Phase III.

PHASE III – Capture remaining objectives west of Caen to phase line OAK, indicated by the Caen-Bayeux railway.

PHASE IV – reorganize on phase line OAK and prepare to meet the anticipated German counter-attack.

The division was supported by the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade and the headquarters of the 4th Special Service Brigade and its component No. 48 (Royal Marine) Command came under Canadian command, tasked with securing the division’s boundary east of LANGRUNE-SUR-MER. According to the army’s official history: “Other Commandos would land on neighbouring beaches, in the sector allotted to the 3rd British Division ... immediately east of the inter-divisional boundary...Later on D Day these Commandos were to capture the big radar station near Douvres-la-Delivrande before moving west to hold crossings over the Seulles between Creully and Amblie.”

What actually happened?

Both Canadian assault brigades made a successful lodgement in their assigned sectors and gained phase line YEW. It had not been easy. Slight delays in assembling put H-Hour back ten minutes, with higher tides making obstacle clearing difficult. The mines attached to the obstacles, combined with rough seas and enemy defensive fires which were less heavy than feared, caused heavier losses to the landing craft at Juno than the British beaches – though usually after the troops were deposited. The war diary of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles noted “The bombardment having failed to kill a single German or silence one weapon, these companies had to storm their positions `cold' - and did so without hesitation.” The bombardment did little to the defences facing the Regina Rifles either, but their tank support landed 20 minutes ahead of the infantry and eliminated a number of heavy weapons before the infantry arrived. The Queen’s Own Rifles and North Shore Regiment preceded their tank support onto the beach. The QOR landed 200 yards off target, and half of B Company was shot down coming ashore directly in front of a German defensive position. It was the only assault battalion reporting the tank support ineffective, and the hardest hit, losing 143 men.

The reserve brigade came ashore in support of the 8th Brigade at about H+4. They passed through to continue the advance, met light resistance and, according to the army history, “it was now evident that the advanced guard units could not reach their objective in the Carpiquet area before dark.” The division formed a series of “fortress” positions in the vicinity of phase line ELM. By late afternoon it was evident that the division would not reach Phase Line OAK before dark. Commanders therefore consolidated on positions generally around Phase Line ELM and prepared to meet the expected German counter-attacks. In the event, one troop (four tanks) did make it as far as the Caen-Bayeux railway but quickly pulled back. That they were able to do so spoke to “how slight the resistance on the 7th Brigade’s front was.”

The Army history continues: “The Division had made much less progress than the day’s plans had called for.” However, casualties were lighter than feared, with 340 fatalities, 574 wounded and 47 taken prisoner. By nightfall, no Allied unit in any of the five beachhead areas was on the final objective line.

The radar site at Douvres-la-Délivrande, one of the Luftwaffe's principal radar stations in Normandy, has been preserved as a museum and this bunker was photographed in 2025. This maze of reinforced bunkers, trenches, minefields, barbed wire, and heavy weapons held out for twelve days after being bypassed on D-Day. The garrison was even resupplied by air—a rare measure that reflected the importance the Germans attached to the position. (Wikipedia Commons photograph by user Dave osm, CC 4.0)

As anticipated, the German armoured counter-attacks began late on June 6th by elements of the 21st Panzer Division, and the 12th SS Panzer Division began a series of heavy counterattacks directly at the Canadians the next day. Their frustrations at their inability to break through to the beach led to the infamous murder of dozens of Canadian prisoners.

The real objective?

Historian Marc Milner, analyzing the original operational plans, noted in his book "Stopping the Panzers" that the 3rd Canadian Division was equipped with an unusual concentration of artillery and anti-tank guns, and that their primary objective was the defeat of the German armoured counter-attack. The open ground west of Caen was considered favourable terrain for a German armoured counter-attack, and Allied planners were well aware of German doctrine emphasizing rapid, powerful counter-attacks against amphibious landings. Similar armoured counter-attacks had been launched against earlier Allied invasions at Gela in Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio.

The missed objective?

Tim Saunders, in his book “Juno Beach” notes that responsibility for advancing on and isolating the Douvres radar site had fallen on the North Shore Regiment as D-Day developed. The site remained in enemy hands on the evening of June 6th and there was no link-up between JUNO and SWORD beaches. The North Shores failed to take the heavily fortified site on June 7th (the unit chaplain described the mortar and artillery preparation as being “like blowing soap bubbles against Gibraltar"). The North Shores received permission to abandon the attack, and another attack by a battalion of the British 51st (Highland) Division also failed. The station eventually fell to British commandos on D+11 (June 17th).

My Final Word

The historical record does not support the claim that Canadian soldiers were the only Allied troops to achieve their D-Day objectives. The official plan called for 3rd Canadian Division to advance considerably farther inland than it ultimately did, and the Douvres radar station remained in German hands. Nevertheless, the Canadians secured a successful lodgement, penetrated farther inland than most other assault formations, and were well positioned to meet the German armoured counter-attacks that Allied planners feared most.